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1. Introduction
Recently, the selfish behavior of customers and Service Providers (SPs) in telecommunications
systems has been widely analyzed using game theory with all its powerful solution concepts.
It was shown in several works that customer’s selfish behavior leads to a network collapse,
where a typical prisonerís dilemma situation arises. Despite of the bounty of works and efforts
investigated in analyzing market share game, this filed is still an ideal tool to understand
interaction among SPs and customers. Indeed, it is common in the literature to assume a
single decision action (e.g., cost) through which an equilibrium would be computed. Yet,
in order to take into account Quality of Service (QoS), it is necessary to incorporate into the
model more than one decision parameter. A simple example is to include both price and some
measure of QoS (e.g., delay, throughput, loss probability, etc.). Other multi-criteria models
may incorporate, for example, delay and reliability, the latter representing the QoS, price or
delay and jitter, etc.
The competition in terms of prices and QoS among SPs entails the formation of
non-cooperative games. We consider multiple SPs (players of the game), where each one seeks
to maximize its own revenue, whereby the whole system of SPs would have no incentive
to deviate from the Nash equilibrium1 point, i.e., the vector of equilibrium strategies. Yet,
such equilibrium point should first mathematically exist. In this chapter, we present a
general model for computing a bi-criteria Nash equilibrium for multiple SPs. We shall then
analyze the interactions between SPs who won’t attract more clients and maximize their
respective profits. We address the important problem of Nash Equilibrium characterization
with two-component action, when the two components of each provider are the service price
and a measure of QoS. Our model is mainly inspired from, [6], where the authors studied a
1 ANash equilibrium is a strategy profile where no player has sensitive to deviate unilaterally from its current strategy.
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Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
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non-cooperative game for pricing problem considering QoS as an extra decision parameter.
The authors build a Markovian model to derive the behavior of customers depending on the
strategic actions of the SPs. In contrast to this chapter, we base our study on the concepts of
demand for the services of a given SP (defined by linear function that depends on the vectors
of prices and QoSs), which is a commonly used function in research related to competitive
network and equilibrium models, [9], [5], to calculate the reputation of an SP in the market.
We focus our studies on the non-cooperative games in terms of stable solutions, which are the
pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game. We do not consider mixed strategy equilibria,
because our environment requires a concrete strategy rather than a randomized strategy,
which would be the result of a mixed strategy. Hence, when using the term Nash equilibrium
we mean pure strategy exact Nash equilibria unless mentioned otherwise.
We note that the most fundamental assumption in relative works of game theory is rationality.
It implies that every player is motivated by increasing his own payoff, i.e. every player is
looking to maximize his own utility. John V. Neumann and Morgenstern justified the idea
of maximizing the expected payoff in their work in [23]. In this context, all information
concerning the game is known to all players, i.e., there is complete information. So, we
consider that all players are said to be rational and intelligent. A rational person is one who
acts in such a way as to maximize his or her expected payoff or utility as economists would
say. An intelligent person is one who can deduce what his or her opponent will do when
acting rationally. In fact, humans use a propositional calculus in reasoning, the propositional
calculus concerns truth functions of propositions, which are logical truths (statements that are
true in virtue of their form). For this reason, the assumption of rational behaviour of players in
telecommunications systems is more justified, as the players are usually devices programmed
to operate in certain ways. However, there are previous studies that have shown that humans
do not always act rationally [10].
Related Works :
Applying game theory in telecommunications problems is an active research area, in which
game-theoretic models have been developed and studied in the last decades, [1, 2, 6, 7,
9, 16, 18]. These models are interested in pricing issues, they proposed non-cooperative
game formulations to analyze behaviours of players that selfishly decide their strategies to
maximize their respective profits. Other works consider the criteria of price as an implicit
parameter, which is determined as a function of the degree of saturation on the network.
Typically in these approaches, the price is a shadow price. For more details on those
approaches see, [14, 15, 24]. Nonetheless, the price of anarchy has been studied in a large
and diverse number of games, e.g., in areas like wireless ad-hoc networks [8, 13], routing and
congestion [4, 19], network creation [3], or facility location [22]. In our model, we do not take
into account network topology, but rather the effective service proposed by each SP as a single
entity. In other words, the price and QoS proposed by an SP will not depend on the source
or destination, distance, etc. that underlies the request of each user. After we have proved
existence of Nash equilibrium, we propose a joint price and QoS algorithm which allows to
learn the equilibrium price and QoS strategies decided by SPs. This is a simple algorithm
implementation with lower computational complexity.
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Organization :
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows : in Section 2 we describe the system model
and introduce a new demand and utility functions. In Section 3 we formulate the joint price
and QoS problem as a non-cooperative game, and investigate existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium solution. Then, we present numerical results obtained from simulations that
exploits our joint price and QoS algorithm in Section 4 . Conclusions and future guidelines
are drawn in Section 5.
2. Problem modeling
In this chapter, we formulate the interaction among service providers (SPs) as a
non-cooperative game. Each SP chooses the Quality of Service to guarantee (it depends on
the amount of requested bandwidth) and the corresponding price.
We consider a systemwith N service providers. Let pi and qi be, respectively, the tariff/pricing
policy and the QoS guaranteed by SP-i. Now, each customer seeks to subscribe to the operator
which allows him to meet a QoS sufficient to satisfy his/her needs, at suitable price. We
consider that behaviors of customer’s has been handled by a simple function so called demand
functions, see equation (1). This later depends on the price and QoS strategies of all SPs. From
a tagged SP’s point of view, the question is to set the best pricing strategy and the best QoS
(amount of bandwidth to request from the network owner). SPs are supposed to know the
effect of their policy on the customer’s subscription policy. Whereas from customer’s point of
view, the question is to find the SP that has the best price-QoS tradeoff conditions.
2.1. Demand model
For simplicity, we consider that the demand function Di for services of the tagged SP-i is
linear with respect to the set price pi and the promised QoS qi, see, [9]. This demand function
depends also on prices p−i and QoS q−i set by the competitors. Namely, the demand function
of SP-i depends on p = [p1, .., pN ] and q = [q1, .., qN ]. Eventually, Di is decreasing w.r.t. pi
and increasing w.r.t. pj, j = i. Whereas it is increasing w.r.t qi and decreasing w.r.t. qj, j = i.
Then, the demand functions w.r.t services of SP-i can be written as follows:
Di(p,q) = D
0
i − α
i
ipi + β
i
iqi + ∑
j,j =i
[
α
j
i pj − β
j
iqj
]
, ∀i ∈ {1, ..,N}. (1)
where D0i is a positive constant used to insure non-negative demands over the feasible region.
While α
j
i and β
j
i are positive constants representing respectively the sensitivity of service
provider i to price and QoS of service provider j.
2.2. Utility model
The total revenue of SP-i is Di(p,q)pi. We assume that we have a single network owner,
this latter charges each SP-i a cost ϑi per unit of requested bandwidth. In order to insure the
customers loyalty, the amount of bandwidth µi required by SP-i should depend on Di(.) and
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on the QoS qi it wishes to offer to its customers. Therefore, the net profit of SP-i is simply the
difference between the total revenue and the fee paid to the network owner:
Ui(p,q) = Di(p,q)pi − Fi(qi,Di), ∀i ∈ {1, ..,N}.
where Fi(qi,Di) is the fee paid by SP-i (investment of SP-i) :
Fi = ϑiµi (qi,Di)
where µi is the amount of bandwidth required by SP-i, such that ϑi is a cost per unit of
requested bandwidth We assume that the QoS corresponds to the expected delay, also we
consider the Kleinrock delay which is a common delay used in Networking Games, so :
qi =
1√
Delayi
=
√
µi − Di
that mean that:
µi = q
2
i + Di
While, the utility function of the SP-i is given by the following formula:
Ui(p,q) = Di(p,q) (pi − ϑi)− ϑiq
2
i , ∀i ∈ {1, ..,N}. (2)
3. A non-cooperative game formulation
For a precise formulation of a non-cooperative game, we have to specify (i) the number of
players, (ii) the possible actions available to each player, and any constraints that may be
imposed on them, (iii) the objective function of each player which she attempts to optimize.
Here we will consider formulation of games where items (i)-(iii) above are relevant.
Let G = [N , {Pi,Qi}, {Ui(.)}] denote the non-cooperative price and QoS game (NPQG),
where N = {1, ..,N} is the index set identifying the SPs, Pi is the price strategy set of SP-i, Qi
is the QoS strategy set of SP-i, and Ui(.) is the utility function. Each SP-i selects a price pi ∈ Pi
and a QoS measure qi ∈ Qi. Let the price vector p = (p1, .., pN)
T ∈ PN = P1 × P2 × ...× PN ,
QoS vector q = (q1, .., qN)
T ∈ QN = Q1 × Q2 × ...× QN (where T represents the transpose
operator). The utility of SP-i when it decides the strategy price pi to allocate the QoS qi is
given in equation (2). We assume that the strategy spaces Pi and Qi of each SP are compact
and convex sets with maximum and minimum constraints, For any given user i we consider
strategy spaces the closed intervals Pi = [pi, pi] and Qi = [qi, qi].
In order to maximize their utilities, each SP-i decides a price pi and QoS qi. Formally, the
NPQG problem can be expressed as:
max
pi∈Pi ,qi∈Qi
Ui(p,q), ∀i ∈ N . (3)
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3.1. The Nash equilibrium
Considering rationality of service providers, the Nash equilibrium concept is the natural
concept solution of the NPQG game. We first will investigate the Nash equilibrium solution
for the induced game as defined in the previous section. Wewill show that a Nash equilibrium
solution exists and is unique by using the theory of concave games, [20]. We recall that a
non-cooperative game G is called concave if all players’ utility functions are strictly concave
with respect to their corresponding strategies, [20].
According to, [20], a Nash equilibrium exists in a concave game if the joint strategy space
is compact and convex, and the utility function that any given player seeks to maximize
is concave in its own strategy and continuous at every point in the product strategy space.
Formally, if the weighted sum of the utility functions with nonnegative weights:
ϕ = ∑
i=1
xiUi, xi > 0 ∀i. (4)
is diagonally strictly concave, this implies that the Nash equilibrium point is unique. The
notion of diagonal strict concavity means that an individual user has more control over its
utility function than the other users have on it, and is proven using the pseudo-gradient of the
weighted sum of utility functions, [20].
Fixed-Price Game : Considering some fixed price policy, a Nash equilibrium in QoS is
formally defined as:
Definition 1. A QoS vector q∗ = (q∗1 , .., q
∗
N) is a Nash equilibrium of the NPQG : G =
[N , {Pi,Qi}, {Ui(.)}] if, for every i ∈ N , Ui(q
∗
i , q
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(q
′
i , q
∗
−i) for all q
′
i ∈ Qi.
Theorem 1. A Nash equilibrium in terms of QoS for game G = [N , {Pi,Qi}, {Ui(.)}] exists and is
unique.
Proof. To prove existence, we note that each SP’s strategy spaceQi is defined by all QoSs in the
closed interval bounded by the minimum and maximum QoSs. Thus, the joint strategy space
Q is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of the Euclidean space RN . In addition, the
utility functions are concave with respect to QoSs as can be seen from the second derivative
test:
∂2Ui(p,q)
∂q2i
= −2ϑi < 0, ∀i ∈ N , (5)
which ensures existence of a Nash equilibrium.
In order to prove uniqueness, we follow, [20], and define the weighted sum of user utility
functions.
ϕ(q, x) =
N
∑
i=1
xiUi(qi,q−i), (6)
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The pseudo-gradient of (6) is given by :
g(q, x) =
[
x1∇U1(q1,q−1), ..., xN∇UN(qN ,q−N)
]T
(7)
The Jacobian matrix J of the pseudo-gradient (w.r.t. q) is written
J =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x1
∂2U1
∂q21
x1
∂2U1
∂q1∂q2
· · · x1
∂2U1
∂q1∂qN
x2
∂2U2
∂q2∂q1
x2
∂2U2
∂q22
· · · x2
∂2U2
∂q2∂qN
...
...
. . .
...
xN
∂2UN
∂qN∂q1
xN
∂2UN
∂qN∂q2
· · · xN
∂2UN
∂q2N
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
−2x1ϑ1 0 · · · 0
0 −2x2ϑ2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · −2xNϑN
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Thus, J is a diagonal matrix with negative diagonal elements. This implies that J is negative
definite. Henceforth [J+ JT ] is also negative definite, and according to Theorem (6) in, [20],
the weighted sum of the utility functions ϕ(q, x) is diagonally strictly concave. Thus the
fixed-price Nash equilibrium point
q∗i ∈ argmax
qi∈Qi
Ui(qi,q
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ N . (8)
is unique.
Fixed-QoS Game : When fixing the QoS, a Nash equilibrium in terms of price is formally
defined as :
Definition 2. A price vector p∗ = (p∗1 , .., p
∗
N) is a Nash equilibrium of the NPQG : G =
[N , {Pi,Qi}, {Ui(.)}] if, for every i ∈ N , Ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(p
′
i ,p
∗
−i) for all p
′
i ∈ Pi.
Theorem 2. A Nash equilibrium in terms of price for the game G = [N , {Pi,Qi}, {Ui(.)}] exists
and is unique.
Proof. To prove existence, we note that each SP’s strategy space Pi is defined by all prices in the
closed interval bounded by the minimum and maximum prices. Thus, the joint strategy space
P is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of the Euclidean space RN . In addition, the
utility functions are concave with respect to prices as can be seen from the second derivative
test:
∂2Ui(p,q)
∂p2i
= −2αii < 0, ∀i ∈ N , (9)
which ensures existence of a Nash equilibrium.
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To prove uniqueness we define now the weighted sum of user utility functions
φ(p, x) =
N
∑
i=1
xiUi(pi,p−i), (10)
the pseudo-gradient of this later is given by
g(p, x) =
[
x1∇U1(p1,p−1), ..., xN∇UN(pN ,p−N)
]T
. (11)
In order to show that φ(p, x) is diagonally strictly concave in this case we use the following
lemma proved in, [11].
Lemma 1. If each Ui(p) is a strictly concave function in pi, each Ui(p) is convex in p−i and there
is some x > 0 such that φ(p, x) is concave in p, then [J(p, x) + JT(p, x)] is negative definite, where
J(p, x) is the Jacobian of g(p, x).
From equation (9), we know that Ui(p) is strictly concave in pi. Further
∂2Ui
∂p2j
= 0, ∀i = j,
which implies that Ui(p) is convex in p−i as well. Also, we have that
∂2φ(p, x)
∂p2i
= xi
∂2Ui(pi,p−i)
∂p2i
+
N
∑
j =i
xj
∂2Uj(pi,p−i)
∂p2i
= −2xiα
i
i < 0, ∀i,
then φ(p, x) is concave in pi and from Lemma 1 we have that [J(p, x) + J
T(p, x)] is negative
definite. Thus the weighted sum of utility functions φ(p, x) is diagonally strictly concave. The
fixed-QoS Nash equilibrium point is then unique and is given by
p∗i ∈ argmax
pi∈Pi
Ui(pi,p
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ N . (12)
3.2. The joint price and QoS game
As shown in equations (5) and (9), the utility functions Ui(p,q), ∀i ∈ N , are concave
respectively w.r.t. qi and pi. So, for all, i ∈ N , the QoS and price conditions which maximizes
the utility given in equation (2) are respectively :
⎧⎨

∂Ui(p,q)
∂qi
= 0
∂Ui(p,q)
∂pi
= 0
Thus, the computation of Nash Equilibrium can be performed by solving latter system.
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Now, we turn to develop a fully distributed algorithm to learn the two-parameter equilibrium.
Designing distributed algorithms that converge quickly to equilibrium is one of the foremost
research goals in algorithmic game theory, and convex programs have played a crucial role
in the design of algorithms for markets. Assuming that Providers are selfish and choose
dynamically each one the best price and QoS that maximize his profiles, the distributed
algorithms can be thought of as protocols that players are programmed to follow. The design
and analysis of distributed algorithms converging to equilibria in the context of games has
also received considerable attention, most commonly convergence of best response dynamics.
Solutions of equations induces by vanishing the partial derivatives correspond respectively
to the best response in terms of QoS BRiq(.), and best response Price BR
i
p(.), of each SP-i as a
function of the strategies of its opponents. Since Nash equilibrium point is unique, then a best
response-based dynamics would converge to the joint Price-QoS NE. The two-parameters
best response dynamics is detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Best response dynamics
1: Initialize price and QoS vectors p and q randomly;
2: For each service provider i ∈ N at iteration t :
a) pt+1i = BR
i
p(p
t,qt);
b) qt+1i = BR
i
q(p
t,qt).
3.3. Social welfare and price of anarchy
The concept of social welfare [17] or total surplus [21], is defined as the sum of the utilities
of all agents in the systems (i.e. Providers). It is well known in game theory that agent
selfishness, such as in a Nash equilibrium, does not lead in general to a socially efficient
situation. As a measure of the loss of efficiency due to the divergence of user interests, we use
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [19], this latter is a measure of the loss of efficiency due to actors’
selfishness. This loss has been defined in [19] as the worst-case ratio comparing the global
efficiency measure (that has to be chosen) at an outcome of the noncooperative game played
among actors, to the optimal value of that efficiency measure. A PoA close to 1 indicates
that the equilibrium is approximately socially optimal, and thus the consequences of selfish
behavior are relatively benign. The term Price of Anarchy was first used by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [19] but the idea of measuring inefficiency of equilibrium is older. The
concept in its current form was designed to be the analogue of the "approximation ratio" in
Approximation Algorithms or the "competitive ratio" in Online Algorithms. As in [12], we
measure the loss of efficiency due to actors’ selfishness as the quotient between the social
welfare obtained at the Nash equilibrium and the maximum value of the social welfare:
PoA =
minp,qWNE(p,q)
maxp,qW(p,q)
(13)
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whereW(p,q) =
N
∑
i=1
Ui(p,q) is a welfare function andWNE(p,q) =
N
∑
i=1
Ui(p
∗,q∗) is a sum of
utilities of all actors at Nash Equilibrium.
4. Numerical investigations
To clarify and show how to take advantage from our theoretical study, we suggest to
study numerically the market share game while considering the best response dynamics and
expressions of demand as well as utility functions of SPs. Hence, we consider a system
with two SPs seeking to maximize their respective revenues. Table 1 represents the system
parameter values considered in this numerical study.
α11 = α
2
2 α
1
2 = α
2
1 β
1
1 = β
2
2 β
1
2 = β
2
1 D
1
0 D
2
0
0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 300 250
ϑ1 = ϑ2 p1 = p2 p1, p2 q1 = q2 q1, q2
20 100 1000 0 10
Table 1. System parameters used for numerical examples.
Figures 1 and 2 present respectively curves of the convergence to Nash Equilibrium Price and
to Nash Equilibrium QoS. It is clear that the best response dynamics converges to the unique
Nash equilibrium price and QoS. We also remark that the speed of convergence is relatively
high (around 9 rounds are enough to converge to the joint price and QoS equilibrium).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
100
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140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
Time, t
S
P
s
, 
B
e
s
t 
R
e
s
p
e
n
s
e
 p
ri
c
e
SP−1 : BRp
1
(t)
SP−2 : BRp
2
(t)
Figure 1. Price game : Convergence to the Price Nash equilibrium.
Next we plot in figures 3 and 4, respectively, the interplay of bandwidth cost (ϑi, i ∈ {1, 2}
on the price and QoS at Nash equilibrium, for both SPs that we consider in this example. On
one hand, we note that the equilibrium price for both SPs is increasing with respect to the
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s
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R
e
s
p
e
n
s
e
 Q
o
S
SP−1 : BRq
1
(t)
SP−2 : BRq
2
(t)
Figure 2. QoS game : Convergence to the QoS Nash equilibrium.
bandwidth cost. On the other hand, we note that the equilibrium QoS for all SPs is decreasing
with the bandwidth cost. When the cost of bandwidth decided by the network owner is
cheaper, the SPs invest for more bandwidth, so as to offer better QoS and an attractive price.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
310
320
330
Cost per unit of requested bandwidth : ϑ
1
 = ϑ
2
E
q
u
ili
b
ri
u
m
 p
ri
c
e
SP−1 : price p
1
 at equilibrium
SP−2 :price p
2
 at equilibrium
Figure 3. Equilibrium Prices w.r.t cost per unit of requested bandwidth ϑi .
In the following, we discuss the impact of the system parameters on the system efficiency in
terms of Price of anarchy:
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SP−1 : QoS q
1
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SP−2 : QoS q
2
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Figure 4. Equilibrium QoSs w.r.t cost per unit of requested bandwidth ϑi .
Influence of ϑi (cost per unit of requested bandwidth): Figure 5 shows the PoA variation
curve as a function of the providers’ bandwidth cost ϑi. Without loss of generality, we assume
that ϑ1 = ϑ2. A special feature is that the Nash equilibrium performs well and the loss of
efficiency is only around 8%. This result indicates that the Nash equilibrium of this game is
fair and socially efficient. Henceforth, selfish players would not need the help of a third-part
regulator (who recommends the players the best strategy profile to achieve their respective
best outcomes) to get attracted by the optimum social welfare. However, the network owner
can use the value of the bandwidth cost to control the selfishness/aggressiveness of the service
providers, which will improve the whole network performance.
Influence of α (Sensitivity of SP-i to his price pi) : Figure 6 plots the variation curve of price
of anarchy with respect to α which represents the sensitivity of SP-i to his price pi. In that
figure, we first notice that the price of anarchy increases when α increases, the fact that the
price of anarchy increases with α finds the simple intuition that increasing the sensitivity of
SPs to their prices gives more and more freedom to SPs for optimizing the Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, when α = α11 = α
2
2 = 1, in the other word, when the sensitivity of an SP
to the price of its competitor is zero (α21 = α
1
2 = 0), price of anarchy converges to 1 and so the
equilibrium is approximately socially optimal.
Influence of β (Sensitivity of SP-i to his QoS qi) : Figure 7 illustrates variations of PoA as a
function of, β, which is the sensitivity of SPs to their respective own QoS. We first notice that
the loss of efficiency is around 8%. Moreover the curve of PoA is concave, this latter mean that
there are some, β∗ < 1, which optimizes the equilibrium, (β∗ = β11 = β
2
2 = 0.76, PoA
∗ =
0.925). Surprisingly, the price of anarchy varies slightly (variation of almost 0.001). To explain
this behaviour, Figures 8 and 9 depict, respectively, the curves of equilibrium Price and QoS
of SP-1 and SP-2. We find that the induced variation of the price is much higher compared to
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that of QoS, and subsequently, β (Sensitivity of SPs to their QoS) has a smaller impact on the
system.
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Cost per unit of requested bandwidth : ϑ
1
 = ϑ
2
P
ri
ce
 o
f 
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a
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h
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Price of Anarchy
Figure 5. Price of Anarchy as a function of cost per unit of requested bandwidth ϑi .
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Figure 6. Price of Anarchy as a function of α = α11 = α
2
2 (Sensitivity of SP-i to his price pi)
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Figure 7. Price of Anarchy as a function of β = β11 = β
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5. Conclusion
In this work, we presented and analyzed a framework to model the complex interactions
among SPs as players through a class of two parameter Nash equilibrium models. The
model is based on a simple linear demand functions which describe customer behaviour,
take into account not only the characteristics of a current SP, (SP-i), but also of all other SPs,
(SP-j, j = i), the presence of two parameters describing each SP’s service price and QoS
level. We established uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium point and developed a distributed
algorithm to learn it. Then, our proposed algorithm finds very fast the equilibrium price and
the equilibrium QoS to be chosen by each provider. Our scheme is different from previous
approaches since it involves two varying parameters in a simple implementation and low
complexity. Yet, we have obtained some insightful results such as the interplay of bandwidth
cost. Results found in this work can be further extended to general network considerations,
in particular under non-neutrality perspective or non-linear demand.
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